The Dollar, Gold and the Rise of a New Financial Order
Andy Schectman warns that America’s financial dominance is being weakened gradually as competing nations build a system designed to function without the dollar
In a wide-ranging interview with geopolitical analyst Brandon Weichert, precious-metals expert Andy Schectman presented a troubling assessment of the dollar, America’s expanding debt and the alternative financial system being constructed by China, Russia and other nations. Schectman, CEO of Miles Franklin Precious Metals, did not predict an immediate collapse of the dollar. Instead, he described de-dollarization as a gradual process through which foreign governments are reducing their dependence on American currency, Treasury securities and Western-controlled financial institutions. His warning is that the individual developments may appear insignificant when viewed separately, but together they represent a serious challenge to the financial advantages the United States has enjoyed for generations.
The discussion reached well beyond gold and silver. Schectman and Weichert examined American sanctions, the freezing of Russian assets, the decline of domestic manufacturing, the expansion of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the emergence of new international payment systems, and the growing willingness of central banks to exchange Treasury securities for physical gold. They also discussed the Federal Reserve’s influence over interest rates, the affordability crisis in housing and the possibility that the United States may eventually weaken the dollar deliberately to restore manufacturing and reduce the real burden of its debt.
A financial system built on trust
Schectman began by explaining that the modern dollar-based system ultimately depends on confidence in the United States. Before 1971, foreign governments could exchange dollars for gold at a fixed price. President Richard Nixon ended that arrangement, leaving the dollar without direct gold backing. Its international importance continued because of America’s economic and military strength, the depth of its financial markets and the worldwide use of dollars in energy and commodity transactions. Foreign governments accumulated dollars and invested much of that money in Treasury securities, giving the United States an unusually inexpensive source of financing.
According to Schectman, Washington has weakened this system by using access to dollars and Treasury assets as instruments of foreign policy. He pointed particularly to the freezing of Russian reserves following the invasion of Ukraine. Regardless of one’s view of Russia or the war, he argued that other governments saw the action as proof that assets held within the Western system could be restricted or confiscated if a country fell out of favor with Washington. The same concern applies to the expanding use of economic sanctions and punitive tariffs, which Schectman described in some cases as sanctions presented under another name.
The central issue is trust. A Treasury security is a promise from the United States government, and its attractiveness depends on the belief that the promise will be honored without political interference or severe loss of purchasing power. Schectman believes many governments now see three risks in holding American debt: the asset could be frozen, inflation could reduce its value, or continued federal borrowing could undermine confidence in the government’s ability to manage its obligations responsibly. These concerns do not mean countries will suddenly stop using dollars, but they provide a powerful incentive to construct alternatives.
De-dollarization without a replacement currency
Schectman repeatedly emphasized that the dollar is not about to disappear. It remains the world’s most widely used currency, and no competing national currency is currently prepared to replace it. His argument is that replacing the dollar with another single reserve currency may not be the objective. Rather than placing the Chinese yuan in the dollar’s former position, the emerging system may allow countries to trade in their own currencies and use gold or commodities to settle whatever balance remains between them.
This distinction is important because it changes the way de-dollarization should be understood. Two countries may continue using dollars when convenient while gradually reducing the amount of national wealth they store in Treasury securities. They could conduct more transactions in their own currencies, establish direct payment arrangements and settle outstanding trade balances in gold. Such a system would not eliminate the dollar, but it would reduce the constant international demand that has helped finance American deficits and support the dollar’s purchasing power.
Schectman explained that China may not want the yuan to become the dominant reserve currency because of what economists call the Triffin dilemma. The country issuing the world’s reserve currency must supply enough of that currency to meet international demand, generally requiring persistent trade deficits. Over time, the reserve-currency nation becomes a major consumer while production and manufacturing migrate elsewhere. Schectman believes this contributed to America’s industrial decline. China, having built much of its power upon manufacturing, may have little interest in accepting the same burden. A multipolar system using national currencies and neutral reserve assets could protect China’s manufacturing advantage without requiring the yuan to replace the dollar.
The infrastructure of a competing system
Schectman and Weichert devoted considerable attention to BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the network of regional partnerships developing across Eurasia and the Global South. These organizations connect countries that collectively possess enormous populations, manufacturing capacity, natural resources, energy production and strategic trade routes. They are also creating practical systems that can reduce their reliance on Western financial and transportation networks.
The emerging infrastructure includes trade conducted in national currencies, digital payment systems operating outside the traditional Western network, new development banks, expanded commodity exchanges and precious-metals vaults located in multiple countries. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and the international mBridge project were discussed as examples of technology that could eventually reduce dependence on the SWIFT financial-messaging system. Schectman also described efforts to connect metals exchanges and vaults in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Dubai, Mumbai and other locations, allowing participating countries to convert trade balances into physical gold without routing the transaction through Western institutions.
The development is not exclusively financial. Alternative shipping, rail and road corridors are connecting China, Russia, Iran and India while reducing exposure to traditional maritime chokepoints controlled or monitored by Western naval power. Schectman considers the International North-South Transport Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative important parts of the same transformation. Financial independence becomes far more meaningful when countries also possess the physical ability to move goods without relying on routes vulnerable to Western sanctions or military pressure.
Neither BRICS nor the Shanghai Cooperation Organization operates like NATO or the European Union. Their members have different interests and are not governed by a powerful central authority. Schectman believes this cooperative structure may be an advantage because members can work together where their interests overlap without surrendering their national independence. Instead of confronting the United States directly, they are quietly building institutions that give them the option of operating outside the American system.
Gold returns as a neutral reserve asset
Gold occupied a central position throughout the interview. Schectman does not expect consumers to begin purchasing groceries with gold coins or governments to recreate the monetary system that existed before 1971. He believes gold will return behind the scenes as a reserve asset, a settlement mechanism and a source of credibility for new digital financial systems. Gold’s appeal is that it does not depend upon another country’s promise. Physical metal cannot be printed, electronically erased or frozen by a foreign government once it is held inside a nation’s borders or in a trusted regional vault.
Central banks have been purchasing unusually large quantities of gold, with China, Russia, India and Poland among the most closely watched buyers. Schectman suggested that some governments may be acquiring considerably more than they officially report. He was particularly interested in Poland’s explanation that physical gold provides protection in the unlikely event that electronic financial records or payment systems become inaccessible. To Schectman, it is significant that the institutions responsible for creating currency are purchasing the one monetary asset no government can manufacture.
China’s expansion of gold exchanges and regional vaulting facilities fits this strategy. If a country receives yuan or another national currency through trade, it could potentially convert the balance into physical gold through an Asian or Middle Eastern exchange. This arrangement allows trading partners to accept a currency without being forced to hold it indefinitely. The currency facilitates the transaction, while gold provides the final store of value. Schectman believes this combination of modern digital payment technology and an ancient neutral asset could eventually become a serious competitor to the dollar-centered system.
Silver as a strategic and monetary asset
Schectman is also highly optimistic about silver, which serves as both a monetary metal and an essential industrial material. Silver is used in electronics, energy systems, communications technology, medical equipment and advanced military applications. Unlike gold, much of the silver consumed by industry is difficult or uneconomical to recover. Schectman argued that years of supply deficits, combined with rising technological and military demand, have made physical silver increasingly important.
He pointed to China’s movement from a net silver exporter to a net importer and to unusually large deliveries from COMEX warehouses. Futures markets traditionally allow miners, dealers and manufacturers to protect themselves from price changes, with only a small percentage of contracts resulting in the physical delivery of metal. Schectman believes that pattern is changing as governments and wealthy institutions demand actual possession rather than paper claims. If physical deliveries continue increasing, he believes the ability of paper markets to influence gold and silver prices could eventually weaken.
Schectman also alleged that Western financial institutions have suppressed precious-metals prices and suggested that inexpensive silver benefits the military-industrial complex because advanced weapons systems require large quantities of the metal. He cited previous legal action involving illegal trading practices in precious-metals markets as evidence that manipulation has occurred. However, his broader allegation of a continuing coordinated effort to suppress prices was not independently established during the interview and should be understood as his interpretation of the available evidence.
A speculative theory involving Tether and the Treasury
The most speculative portion of the interview concerned Schectman’s theory that the United States government may be accumulating gold and silver indirectly. He pointed to unidentified buyers taking delivery of enormous quantities of metal through COMEX and to the large gold position accumulated by Tether, the company responsible for the world’s largest dollar-backed stablecoin. Because Tether also holds substantial amounts of short-term Treasury debt and has cooperated with American law enforcement, Schectman suspects it could become part of a broader government strategy.
Stablecoins are digital tokens generally designed to maintain a value of one dollar. Under the emerging American regulatory framework, issuers are expected to support these tokens with safe, short-term assets, including Treasury bills. If stablecoins become widely used for payments, their issuers will need to purchase increasing amounts of Treasury debt. This could create artificial or “synthetic” demand for short-term government securities at a time when foreign governments are becoming less willing to finance American spending.
Schectman theorized that income produced by those Treasury holdings could be directed toward gold purchases. Under this scenario, Tether or other private entities could accumulate metal without the United States government publicly announcing a massive purchasing program. Open government buying would likely cause the gold price to rise immediately, while indirect purchases could permit gradual accumulation. The metal might remain inside commercial vaults under private account names, concealing the identity of the ultimate buyer.
He further theorized that a much higher gold price could serve American policy objectives. If the dollar declined in value against gold, the value of America’s gold reserves would rise while the real burden of dollar-denominated debt would fall. A weaker dollar could also make American manufacturing more competitive by increasing the cost of imported goods and lowering the foreign price of American exports. Schectman openly acknowledged that he has no proof of this arrangement. He presented it as a theory that he believes connects Tether’s gold accumulation, unusually large COMEX deliveries, stablecoin regulation and Washington’s stated desire to restore domestic manufacturing.
Debt, interest rates and the inflationary path
Schectman’s concerns about the dollar are closely connected to America’s debt. The official national debt does not include the full estimated cost of future Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, military benefits and government pensions. When those unfunded commitments are included, Schectman placed the country’s total obligations near $200 trillion. That is not the official debt figure, but rather a broader estimate of current borrowing combined with promises the government has made for future years.
His conclusion is that the obligations cannot realistically be paid with dollars retaining their present purchasing power. The available choices are some form of default, continued inflation or a gradual reduction in the dollar’s reserve role. Schectman believes a controlled decline in the dollar could function as a “soft default,” allowing the government to repay its obligations in currency worth less than when the debt was created. Although this might support manufacturing and reduce the real value of federal debt, it would also impose costs on American households through more expensive goods and reduced purchasing power.
The Federal Reserve’s interest-rate policies were another major subject. Schectman argued that the Fed held rates artificially low following the 2008 financial crisis by purchasing Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities. Cheap credit encouraged borrowing and pushed up the prices of homes, stocks, bonds and other assets. The consequences can now be seen in the housing market, where homeowners with 3% mortgages cannot afford to move if doing so requires replacing those loans at rates near 7%.
Lowering rates again would not necessarily solve the problem because it could push asset prices even higher. Allowing rates to rise freely presents a different danger because banks, pension funds, insurance companies, real estate and government finances are all vulnerable to higher borrowing costs. Schectman believes policymakers will eventually attempt to control interest rates while continuing to expand the money supply. If the normal pressure cannot be released through higher rates, he expects it to emerge through higher consumer prices.
What Schectman believes individuals should do
Schectman’s practical message is that individuals should be cautious about holding too much long-term wealth in cash or other dollar-denominated promises. His preferred assets are gold and silver, which is unsurprising given his profession, but he did not limit the principle to precious metals. Land, selected cryptocurrencies, art and other scarce assets could also provide protection if the dollar continues losing purchasing power.
His concern is not that bank accounts will suddenly disappear. It is that a person may retain the same number of dollars while those dollars purchase progressively less. Inflation can function as a quiet transfer of wealth away from savers, especially those who depend entirely on cash, fixed-income investments or pensions that fail to keep pace with prices. Schectman encouraged listeners to examine global developments independently and reconsider assumptions that may have been reliable during a period of unquestioned American financial dominance.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and a changing world
The final portion of the interview addressed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Bishkek declaration. Weichert noted that the organization’s members condemned American military strikes against Iran, defended Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear-energy development, opposed unilateral sanctions and called for a more multipolar international order. They also supported greater use of national currencies in regional trade and the establishment of a development bank.
Schectman said the organization should no longer be dismissed by Western policymakers. Its members and associated partners include major nuclear powers, energy producers, manufacturing centers and commodity-rich countries. When combined with BRICS, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative, these relationships represent a formidable portion of the world’s population, production and natural resources. They are not yet a unified rival to the West, but they do not need to be completely unified to reduce their dependence on American institutions.
The development of new payment systems, commodity exchanges, vaulting networks, trade corridors and regional banks allows these countries to protect themselves from sanctions and financial pressure. Their objective may not be to destroy the dollar. It may simply be to ensure that they can continue functioning if Washington attempts to exclude them from the existing system. The effect on the United States could be the same: less demand for dollars, fewer foreign purchases of Treasury debt and greater difficulty financing federal deficits without inflation or higher interest rates.
Little by little, then all at once
Schectman summarized the transformation as something occurring “little by little.” No individual trade agreement, gold vault, payment system or commodity exchange will end the dollar’s dominance. The danger arises from the cumulative effect. As more countries gain the ability to trade and preserve reserves outside the dollar system, they have less reason to finance American borrowing or accept Washington’s financial authority.
The dollar is not disappearing tomorrow, and the interview offered no specific timetable for a crisis. Schectman’s strongest argument is that America is steadily surrendering some of the trust that made its currency dominant. Sanctions, frozen reserves, uncontrolled borrowing, inflation and declining industrial capacity have given other nations legitimate reasons to prepare alternatives. His observations about central-bank gold purchases, regional payment systems and changing trade relationships describe developments worthy of serious attention.
Some of Schectman’s additional conclusions remain theories. He did not present direct proof that the Treasury is secretly purchasing precious metals, that Tether is operating as part of a government gold strategy or that silver prices are being suppressed for the benefit of military contractors. Those claims should not be presented as established facts. Nevertheless, the interview’s larger warning deserves consideration: the greatest challenge to the dollar may not arrive through a dramatic declaration from China or Russia. It may come through the quiet construction of a global economy that needs the dollar a little less with each passing year.
America’s reserve-currency advantage has helped keep borrowing costs low, supported the dollar and allowed American consumers to purchase inexpensive imported goods. If that advantage continues weakening, the effects will eventually reach ordinary families through inflation, higher interest rates, reduced purchasing power and greater financial instability. The interview’s final message is not that Americans should panic, but that they should understand the transformation taking place and prepare before gradual change becomes impossible to ignore.
